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ABSTRACT 
  We develop a simple game-theoretic model to explain the production decisions of firms when the 
production of a marketed good is complementary with the output of an associated good for which no 
market is available and the output of both goods is regulated by exogenously determined common pool 
output quotas.  This scenario matches that of many fisheries in which regulators attempt to 
simultaneously manage harvests of targeted species and bycatch of other species through common pool 
quotas and seasonal closures.  Under a competitive equilibrium, individual fishermen fail to fully account 
for the external effects of their harvest decisions on the season length, leading to excessive discards, 
drastically shortened seasons, and large shares of un-harvested quota for all but the smallest of fishery 
sizes.  These results are robust for even very efficient (low-bycatch) fishing gears.  We examine the 
sensitivity of our predictions to changes in output prices, discard costs, quota allocations and differing 
degrees of spatial correlation of target and bycatch species.  Finally, we derive the optimal bycatch 
penalty function and describe its significance in light of various policy alternatives available to regulators.   
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STRATEGIC JOINT PRODUCTION UNDER COMMON-POOL OUTPUT QUOTAS: 
THE CASE OF FISHERIES BYCATCH 
 
“Bycatch and waste are currently the greatest threats to the commercial fishing 
industry…A fish that is caught and thrown back dead does not add anything to the 




The bycatch and discard of non-targeted species is ubiquitous in today’s fisheries.  A wide array of 
factors including the spatial coexistence of marine species, imperfectly selective gear, and incentive-
distorting managerial policies ensure that a significant portion of catch diverges from the desired species, 
sex, or size.  Some of this bycatch does find its way into (typically low-valued) markets, but the vast 
majority is returned to the sea, whether by choice or due to regulatory pressure, in the form of discards.  
One estimate places the volume of discards at 17.9 metric tons a year, approximately 25% of global 
landings (Alverson, 1994) although a reappraisal by Kelleher (2005) places this proportion at around 8%.
2   
The sheer volume of these discards, the charismatic nature of some bycatch species (e.g. sea turtles 
and dolphins), and the potential value of this harvest in targeted fisheries has lead to a vigorous outcry 
from conservation organizations, industry groups, and the general public alike to reduce bycatch and its 
associated mortality.  The upshot of these efforts, particularly in developed countries with entrenched 
traditions of command-and-control fisheries practices, has been a frenzy of new policies directed at 
curtailing various symptoms of the bycatch problem.
3 Among the favored approaches are the mandated 
adoption of bycatch-averting gears and time and area closures to protect vulnerable aggregations of 
bycatch species.  Some gear modifications have achieved marked reductions in bycatch; turtle excluder 
devices (TEDs) in the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery are a notable example.  However, such 
                                                 
1 Quoted in the Congressional Record v.141, H10238, 10/18/95. 
2 A large proportion of this biomass is dead upon discard due to the physiological effects of decompression, the 
weight of fish in a net, or rough handling onboard the ship.  This figure does not include non-fish bycatch or 
incidental catch that was retained for sale.   
3 For instance, since the re-authorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act in 1996 the United States’ NOAA Fisheries 
has been under a Congressional mandate to minimize, “to the extent practicable”, bycatch and its associated 
mortality.  This mandate was made all the more pressing when in 2002 an environmental NGO demanded that 
NOAA initiate rulemaking to “count, cap, and control bycatch in the nation’s fisheries” (Oceana, 2002).        2
technological solutions are considerably less successful when the bycatch species are of similar size and 
shape – as is the case in many demersal trawl fisheries.  In these instances, small reductions in the bycatch 
of one species are typically achieved only at the substantial expense of foregone targeted species (Gauvin, 
Haflinger and Nerini, 1995; Rose and Gauvin, 2000).  Also, gear innovations designed to exclude one 
source of bycatch may do little to help screen out other species.  This appears to be the case in the Gulf of 
Mexico shrimp fishery where the widespread use of TEDs has not curtailed the extremely high discard 
rate of finfish – it is estimated that approximately 4.5 pounds of fish are discarded for every pound of 
shrimp landed (Harrington, Myers and Rosenberg, 2005).      
Spatial and temporal closures are similarly limited in that high-bycatch areas may also be desirable 
for targeted fishing due to habitat overlap or trophic interactions between species, so that closures may 
result in considerable economic losses to fishermen.  Also, spatial heterogeneity in the distributions of 
species may produce scenarios in which the closure of an area to reduce bycatch of one species induces 
the increased bycatch of another species as effort is diverted to alternative grounds.
4   
  Given the potential inadequacy of these remedies, it should come as no surprise that regulators have 
sought more direct methods of bycatch management.  In many cases this has taken the form of explicit 
industry-wide quotas, demarcated by gear class, space and/or time, for catch or landings on both target 
and bycatch species.  These quotas are enforced by the seasonal closure (or extreme curtailment) of the 
fishery upon the attainment of any of these quotas.  Of economic importance is that if the bycatch quota is 
attained before that of the target species, then the fishery is effectively terminated for the remainder of the 
season.  In some cases the quotas are allocated on an individual vessel basis (as for halibut bycatch quota 
in the Alaska sablefish fishery) and may even be freely transferable across vessels (as in the New Zealand 
and Iceland IFQ programs).  But it is frequently the case that the quotas are allocated to an entire fleet and 
are thus common pool resources to many fishermen.  This is most notably the case in several valuable 
                                                 
4 This notion has received little attention in the fisheries literature but is a leading hypothesis to explain the turn of 
events following the closure of an area to flatfish trawl fishing in the Eastern Bering Sea in 1995.  Crab bycatch (the 
motivation for the closure) fell following its implementation but halibut incidental catch showed a significant 
increase (Gauvin, Haflinger and Nerini, 1995).     3
North Pacific fisheries where fishermen for a variety of groundfish species (most notably cod, flatfish and 
rockfish) operate on a common quota basis.   
  The implications of open access have been extensively cataloged since Gordon’s seminal 1954 
contribution.  Consequences of open access institutions in fisheries may include  
biological overexploitation, distorted capital inputs, reduced product quality, and excessive habitat 
destruction to name but a few.  Homans and Wilen (1997) extended the pure open access case by 
examining a regulated open access fishery in which access is open, but participants are quota-regulated.  
They show how the profit responsiveness of effort, in combination with purposeful regulation of season 
length to ensure output targets are not exceeded, leads to the dissipation of rents and abbreviated seasons.  
In one of the first papers to specifically address the economics of bycatch, Boyce (1996) characterized the 
open access outcome in a two species system with a joint harvesting technology and found that open 
access leads to excessive entry and a shortened season relative to the optimal static outcome.  Writing 
about the related topic of discards in an individual fishing quota (IFQ) system, Anderson (1994), Arnason 
(1994), and Turner (1997) conclude that IFQs on landings tend to generate incentives that promote 
excessive discards of lesser valued grades or species (a practice known as highgrading). This occurs 
despite Boyce’s finding that IFQs (which are based upon catch in his formulation) could generate the 
static optimal outcome provided none of the species involved possessed a non-market value. 
  It should be noted that all of this bycatch research has focused on somewhat polar examples (e.g. first 
best optimum or IFQs vs. open access) of fishery management institutions rather than the “middle 
ground” that often characterizes many real-world fisheries.  Many fisheries operate under limited access 
whereby a restricted group of users competes with imperfectly selective gear under multiple fleet-wide 
quotas.  This combination of limited participation, imperfectly selective gears, and common property 
quotas opens up the interesting possibility of strategic behavior in the harvest decisions of fishermen.
5  In 
                                                 
5 Strategic behavior in the arena of bycatch and discards is not a foreign topic in the literature.  Herrera (2004) and 
Jensen and Vestergaard (2002) consider the problem of strategic interactions between catch-discarding fishermen 
and a regulator; however, their work concerns the moral hazard problem that arises due to imperfect observability of 
catch to regulators whereas ours focuses on the intra-seasonal game played between fishermen and between   4
these real-world fisheries, fishermen know that regulators will either close or drastically curtail the target 
fishery when one of the quotas becomes binding.  This fact gives fishermen the incentive to consider, if 
only partially, the impact of their harvest behavior, conditional on the anticipated behavior of their 
competitors, on the equilibrium season length.  This strategic behavior, when wedded to the complexities 
inherent in joint production, may yield a rich array of behaviors.  Illuminating the connection between 
regulatory institutions, fishermen’s incentives and bycatch outcomes in this context is a worthwhile 
undertaking, not only for understanding the status quo, but also to aid in the development of more 
effective policies for solving the bycatch policy problem.      
  To this end, we develop a simple static game in which fishermen jointly harvest a target and a bycatch 
species in a setting where the avoidance of the bycatch species entails increased costs in terms of 
foregone target species harvest.  Regulators observe fishermen’s behavior and close the fishery when 
either the predetermined target or bycatch quotas bind for the industry.  In Section 2 we lay out the model 
structure and solve the quota-constrained social planner’s problem.  In Section 3 we present the 
symmetric, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium to the game theoretic model and show how it relates to the 
optimal solution.  Section 4 explores the significance of our findings by considering the effects of changes 
to the policy variables and by exploring the nature of the remedies needed to bring the non-cooperative 
behavior of fishermen into accord with the objectives of the social planner.  Section 5 concludes the 
analysis.        
 2. THE MODEL AND THE QUOTA-CONSTRAINED OPTIMUM 
  Assume for a particular season there are N vessels operating in the fishery.  The vessels and their 
captains are homogeneous in all respects and they face no significant stock or congestion externalities and 
intra-seasonal discounting of rents is minimal so that a static modeling framework can be reasonably 
employed.  We also presume that unavoidable fixed costs coupled with the costs of reconfiguring capital 
                                                                                                                                                             
fishermen and regulators even when complete and perfect information is available on all sides.  In some fisheries 
(such as many in the EU) this moral hazard problem is likely significant due to a lack of extensive onboard 
monitoring and enforcement while in still others (as in the heavily monitored North Pacific groundfish fisheries) it 
may be of lesser importance.     5
ensure that fishermen remain in the fishery and do not alter their gear in the course of a season so that 
only variable revenues and costs are salient to decision making.  At the beginning of the season, captain i 
makes a choice of the quantity of target species to harvest (hX ) on a daily basis, limited by restrictions of 
gear, fishing time, and the intrinsic productivity of the grounds so that  h hX ≤ ≤ 0 . 
  There is a corresponding level of bycatch ( ) ( X B h h ) associated with this choice of harvest.  This 
function has the following properties:            
  Assumption 1.   0 , 0 , 0 ) 0 (
' ' ' > > = B B B h h h . 
This assumption describes bycatch as the unavoidable complement of the harvest of the targeted species.  
Furthermore, this incidental catch increases at an increasing rate with the rate of harvest.  These 
technological assumptions imply that the avoidance of bycatch necessitates that a greater degree of care 
be exercised in the pursuit of the target species, thus slowing its rate of harvest.  For instance, in a 
heterogeneous marine environment, overlapping habitat and feeding preferences may cause population 
densities of bycatch and target species to exhibit a high overall degree of spatial correlation.  Seeking out 
local exceptions to this global tendency may entail substantial investments of time, and even when such 
low bycatch areas are found, they may possess lower densities of the targeted species.
6   
  This technical description has an analogous relationship to the prototypical model of the polluting 
firm (a relationship first noticed by Boyce (1995)).  Captains may only avoid pollution (bycatch) at the 
expense of harvest, and the marginal cost of “abatement” (the value of the foregone catch) is increasing as 
fishermen strive to fish in a “cleaner” fashion.   
  To simplify the derivations of the mathematical solutions to the problem, we propose the following 
simple form for the bycatch function: 
 1 , 0 , ) ( > > = α
α b bh h h X X B                       (1) 
                                                 
6 This spatial motivation for bycatch avoidance has a respectable empirical basis.  Adlerstein and Trumble (1998a,b) 
find substantial evidence of spatial and temporal patterns which might be exploited to avoid halibut bycatch in the 
Bering Sea groundfish fisheries.  The voluntary establishment of spatial bycatch control systems (e.g. Gauvin, 
Haflinger and Nerini, 1995) lends further support to the supposition that fishermen can affect their bycatch rate for a 
given gear configuration through the careful choice of fishing location.   6
Fishermen supply their harvest for which they obtain a fixed price p, which is the market ex-vessel price 
net of the costs of any on-ship processing.  They also face a direct unit cost for the sorting and discard of 
bycatch; we represent these costs by c.  Seasonal variable rents are thus: 
 ) ( ) ( X B X X h ch ph h − = π                        (2)         
  Note that this function is concave, although not necessarily increasing, for all feasible values of hX.  
Notice the absence of any direct costs for the harvest of the target species.  This reflects our assumption 
that once a captain has committed to full participation in the fishery – as indeed he must given his 
assumed lack of short-run flexibility – there is no obvious relationship mapping the expenditure of 
variable inputs (such as fuel) to fishing output.  Notice as well the lack of any revenue from the catch of 
the bycatch species.  This assumption is maintained for the sake of clarity of the analytical results and 
also to reflect the nature of many fisheries in which the landing of bycatch species is either economically 
prohibitive or expressly forbidden.  For instance, in the groundfish fisheries of Alaska, the retention of 
halibut and certain crab bycatch is prohibited in order to diminish the incentives to target these valuable 
species while putatively pursuing groundfish.   
  The regulator is charged with the task of enforcing quotas on both the target and bycatch species 
which are denoted by QX and QB respectively.  They accomplish this by manipulating the season length, 
T.  They perfectly observe the daily harvest and bycatch of all fishermen and close the entire fishery when 
either one of the quotas is met or the maximum season (T ) is achieved.  This decision rule (in effect the 
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  Before presenting the solution to the social planner’s problem, we find it convenient to make the 
following simple assumption:   7
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This assumption assures that there is sufficient participation in the fishery so that both quotas can be 
exhausted when all vessels harvest at their maximum rate – so that the use of quota regulation is in some 
sense “justified” by the size of the fleet.  This maximum rate may be less than the physical upper bound 
on harvest if the daily profit function peaks at a value ( max π h ) that is less than h .  In this instance, it is 
never sensible, either in the social planner or noncooperative case, for a vessel to harvest on the 
decreasing arm of the daily profit function since doing so will only result in a lose-lose situation of lower 
daily profits and a shortened season.  Assumption 2 is of some use in the following derivations as it 
allows us to eliminate a priori uninteresting cases in which both quotas are slack. 
  This formality aside, we can now express the objective function of the quota-constrained social 
planner:  























π                  (4) 
The planner maximizes seasonal rents subject to the constraints of the quota allocations and the maximum 
season length.  Note that Assumption 2 precludes any case in which T binds alone.   
  Given the concavity of daily profits, it is clearly optimal to harvest at a minimal rate such that one of 
the quotas just binds at the maximum season length.  From the vantage of the entire fishery, the marginal 
benefits from cutting back on harvest – the increases in profits from a longer fishing season – always 
exceed the costs incurred from smaller daily harvests.  This logic is expressed mathematically in the 
following theorem: 
  Theorem 1.  The quota constrained optimal program (
*
X h,

























































   
Notice that the determination of the binding quota is dependent upon the number of active vessels in the 
fishery.  Large numbers of fishermen only need to harvest at a low intensity for a quota to bind by T .  
Low rates of harvest also correspond to regions of low bycatch rates and so QX binds.  Obviously, the 
larger the relative magnitude of QX to QB the larger the range of fishery sizes for which QB binds and vice 
versa.  Finally, it should be noted that these conditions necessitate a steady decline in the optimal rate of 
harvest, and also the bycatch rate, as N increases.  High bycatch rates are solely a phenomenon of lightly 
capitalized fisheries when the fishery is managed optimally. 
3. THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION 
  Of course, under the incentive structures existing in most commercial fisheries, the social planner’s 
harvest profile is of little relevance since fishermen compete without secure access privileges for the 
allowable harvest quota.  Total industry-wide quota allocations in many scientifically managed fisheries 
are fairly transparent and are announced prior to the opening of the season.  As a result, we should expect 
that fishermen would incorporate the quota rule into their decision processes.  Formally speaking, the 
objective for fisherman i is: 
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−  is a (N-1)x1 vector of the harvest choices of other fishermen.  The game is played in two 
stages.  In the first stage – presumably happening just prior to the opening of the season – fishermen 
simultaneously choose their daily harvest rate for the season while taking into account the anticipated 
actions of their competitors and the decision rule of the regulator.  In the second stage, the regulator   9
closes the fishery as mandated by this rule.
7  The equilibria we henceforth describe as Nash equilibria are 
thus actually subgame-perfect equilibria, although in an unusual sense as the “reaction function” of the 
regulator is predetermined by his legal role in the system rather than arising from the consideration of his 
own preferences. 
  For the sake of simplicity, we consider only symmetric, pure strategy Nash equilibrium solutions.  
Therefore, in equilibrium all fishermen select a single daily harvest rate that is in their best interest given 
the exact same behavior on the part of their competitors.  Furthermore, the fishermen’s shared conjecture 
of the binding season length and quota are supported in equilibrium by the induced behavior of the 
regulator.  If a fisherman foresees that a particular quota will bind in equilibrium, then the agent’s 
reaction function is defined by the first order condition: 
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The choice of harvest rate is thus determined by a tug-of-war between the marginal benefits of increased 
daily profits (the left hand side of (5)) and the personal marginal costs due to a reduction in fishing 
opportunities from an increase in the harvesting rate.  Fishermen do not, however, consider the external 
costs of their choice on the remainder of the fleet.   
  Despite the appealing simplicity of the preceding result, there are various features of the individual 
decision problem that prevent it from serving as an adequate characterization of an agent’s reaction 
function.  Firstly, constraints on the maximum season length and harvest rate may lead to cases in which 
(5) cannot be satisfied.  Secondly, the regulatory decision function, although continuous in hX is not 
differentiable at the breakpoints between quotas.  This implies that agents, when faced with the choice of 
selecting a harvest rate that alters the binding quota regime, must conduct a non-marginal comparison of  
                                                 
7 Notice that regulators exactly enforce quota rules and are thus immune to any pressure from the industry to protract 
the season.  In fisheries with well-established scientific management practices where regulatory hierarchies separate 
the tasks of quota setting and enforcement (as in the federal fisheries off Alaska) this may be the case.  Deviations of 
total catch from quota nonetheless occur but are typically the result of imperfect systems of catch accounting and 
regulatory control rather than the results of political corruption.  Wilen and Homans (1998) develop a model in 
which both biological and political criteria affect management.     10
whether such a shift is in their best interest.   
  Figure 1 reveals the substance of these observations in graphical form for the choice of parameter 
values given in Table 2 and with N=2 (motivation for these particular parameter values will be supplied in 
the next section).  The first panel shows a particular vessel’s profits as a function of its own harvest and 
that of its competitor.  A close examination of this graph reveals that rather than being smooth, it is 
actually perforated by multiple ridges.  The exact nature of these ridges is clearly revealed in the second 
panel which shows the level sets of the individual profit function.  The third panel in the figure 
demonstrates that these kinks in the level sets are essentially borders between regimes in the quota system 
that hold for particular values of own and competitor harvest.  By finding the highest point on the profit 
surface (i.e. the highest level set) for each level of competitor harvest, we can effectively define the 
reaction function of the fisherman – as demonstrated in both the second and third panels of Figure 1.  A 
glance at this reaction function shows a number of distinct “phases” through which a reaction function 
typically passes; understanding each of these phases is useful for comprehending the decision process of 
fishermen and the nature of the Nash equilibrium.    
  Note first, that for small rates of competitor harvest, it is possible for our fisherman to cause QB to 
bind alone.  However, the agent optimally chooses instead to harvest along the knife-edge of the QB / 
T boundary – reacting to increasing conjectured harvest on the part of his competitor by decreasing his 
own catch.  Recall from the social planner case, that the system-wide marginal benefits of increasing 
harvest are always exceeded by the marginal costs of doing so.  When the competitor harvests very little, 
then our fisherman essentially constitutes the entire fishery and so he internalizes a sufficiently large 
quantity of the marginal costs of his harvest so that his behavior mimics that prescribed by the social 
planner.  Similar logic applies at the boundary between T and QX.  In either case, the constraint on the 
maximum season length has a positive shadow value – our fisherman is willing to incur a cost 
proportional to the wedge between the marginal costs and benefits of increased harvest to raise T .  This 
excess of marginal costs over benefits can be clearly seen in the second panel by noting how, for low  11
levels of competitor harvest, the profit contours are bowed backwards from the cusps along the QX / 
T boundary.     
  Of course this dominant behavior cannot stand in the face of increased competition.  The growing rate 
of harvest of the competitor increasingly dilutes the proportion of the full marginal costs of harvest that 
are born by the individual so that eventually marginal benefits of increased harvest exceed marginal costs 
at T .  Then it is no longer individually rational to meet increased competitor harvesting by decreasing 
one’s own fishing.  Marginal personal benefits and costs are instead equalized at a season length below 
the maximum and increases in harvest intensity on the part of one’s competitors are responded to in kind.  
This can be seen in the first increasing stretch of the reaction function in Figure 1.     
  For sufficiently large values of competitor harvest, an individual agent faces a similar scenario to that 
experienced on the boundary with T , only now the decision is one of whether to take action (by lowering 
one’s own harvest rate) to preserve a situation in which QX binds.  Not surprisingly, the decision depends 
on the relative magnitude of marginal benefits to marginal costs evaluated at QB binding.  If the marginal 
costs of harvest exceed the marginal benefits, then the target species quota has a positive shadow value 
and the agent finds it best to draw back on his own harvest and cling to the razor’s edge where both QX 
and QB hold simultaneously.  This explains the second downward phase of the reaction function along in 
Figure 1.  Of course, the “dilution” of marginal costs with increases in competitor harvest continues to 
apply, and so the captain eventually chooses to raise his effort so that QB binds and marginal benefits and 
costs are once again equalized.    
  Figure 2 presents the same information for the case in which N = 12.
8  The first panel clearly shows 
how even small rates of harvest from the eleven competitors quickly decrease one’s own profits while the 
steep, almost vertical frontiers between quota contours in the third panel show the decreased sensitivity of 
the realized quota to individual manipulation.  The reaction function shows all the same qualitative 
                                                 
8 In order to reduce the dimension of this graph to three dimensions, we force the (N-1) competitors to act as if they 
coordinate so as to harvest at an identical rate.  Although, not strictly correct in terms of the game-theoretic 
motivation, no substantial harm arises from this simplification due to our focus on symmetric equilibria.  12
characteristics as the N = 2 case (including a brief and scarcely visible phase along the QB/ T frontier for 
minute quantities of competitor harvest) with one notable additional feature.  Notice how the increase in 
the function in the QX region is eventually limited by the maximum feasible harvest rate.  Due to the 
quantity of competitors and their relatively high rate of harvest, personal marginal costs are driven to a 
level where they are exceeded by marginal benefits at even the highest harvest intensity.  This explains 
the flat stretch of the reaction function in Figure 2.       
  The symmetric Nash equilibria for both of these scenarios are indicated by the intersection of the 
reaction function and the 45° line in the third panels of Figures 1 and 2.  When N = 2 the equilibrium 
occurs with both players harvesting at a level such that QX  binds at a season length less than T .  When N 
= 12 the equilibrium occurs with all players harvesting at maximum capacity with a (much) shorter 
season than previously.  These cases demonstrate two of six qualitatively different equilibrium classes; 
the various symmetric Nash equilibrium harvest rates along with their necessary and sufficient conditions 
are presented in Table 1 for the most general case in which it is technologically feasible for either QX or 
QB to bind.
9  Equilibrium conditions for the alternative case in which only QX can bind as well as proofs 
for all conditions are presented in the Appendix. 
  While not immediately transparent, these mathematical conditions yield some interesting generalities 
on closer inspection.  Note that for fixed values of the parameters, the determination of the pertinent 
equilibrium is solely a matter of the number of participating vessels.  Indeed, these conditions exhaust the 
range of fishery sizes fulfilling Assumption 2 and never overlap in N such that these conditions yield one 
and only one Nash equilibrium solution for a given set of parameters.   
  The equilibria given in the first and fourth rows of Table 1 are interior in that marginal personal 
benefits and costs are balanced.  They correspond to equilibria occurring in the increasing stretches of the 
reaction function.  Indeed, the equilibrium described in the first row of the table corresponds with that 
                                                 








B ≤ .  13
shown in Figure 1.  Not surprisingly, the equilibrium harvest rate is increasing in the number of 
participants.  Note also that QX binds for a smaller range of fishery sizes than does QB.   
  The conditions in the second and fifth rows describe corner solutions in which the season length 
constraint has a positive shadow value.  The case in which QX binds clearly maps to lower values of N 
than its interior analog.  Intuitively, this equilibria occurs when an alternative “equilibrium” at the interior 
harvest rate would lead to a slack quota at season’s end; as a result, individuals have an incentive to nudge 
their effort upward until the target quota is exhausted just as  T T = .  The fifth row shows two cases in 
which QB binds at  T T = .  The first condition implies values of N that are not only too small for an 
interior QB solution but are also too small for QX to bind in any equilibrium (interior or not).  The second 
set of conditions describes a situation in which N is too large for a QX equilibria (in other words, the 
“peak” of the objective function occurs at a value of hX that is beyond the range of harvest rates for which 
QX binds) and yet too small for an interior equilibrium in QB to bind in  T T ≤ .  In either of these cases, a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium occurs where the harvest rate just exhausts QB at T .  Note how for both the 
QX and QB corner solutions, the equilibrium harvest rate is decreasing in fishery participation as 
prescribed by the social planner’s solution.  Indeed the symmetric Nash equilibrium harvest rates for these 
two cases correspond exactly with those of the social planner’s solution – albeit for fisheries of limited 
size. 
  The solution depicted in the third row occurs for an intermediate range of N and reflects a situation in 
which N is too large for QX  to bind and yet too small for QB to hold in either an interior sense or with 
T binding.  In this case the quota on the target species possesses a positive shadow value and so the 
equilibrium harvest rate is invariant over a range of fishery sizes.  This equilibrium occurs in the 
downward sloping phase of the reaction function along the QX /QB frontier shown in Figures 1 and 2.  
  The sixth row solution reflects a situation in which the fishery is sufficiently large so that marginal 
benefits cannot be reconciled with marginal costs for the bounded range of possible harvest rates.  In this 
case (which corresponds to the graphical situation depicted in Figure 2) fishermen are compelled to  14
harvest at the maximum possible rate throughout the season.  We may therefore expect that for fisheries 
over some critical participation threshold (the value of which is given in row 6 of Table 1) an increase in 
the number of competitors will carry no significant behavioral effects, at least in the short run, although 
the length of season and average rents will continue to decline with entry.
10    
  Figure 3 provides a graphical depiction of the spectrum of symmetric Nash equilibrium harvest rates, 
season lengths and total rents for a range of fishery sizes and compares their values against those 
associated with the social planner’s solution.  It also displays the percentage of each quota harvested in 
equilibrium for every case.  The parameter values used for this simulation are presented in Table 2 and 
were chosen so that sorting and discard costs are relatively high while ensuring that daily profits are 
strictly increasing over the range of allowable harvest rates.  Qualitative observations on real-world 
fisheries suggest that the costs of sorting and discard of bycatch species are typically quite low relative to 
the extra revenues obtained from the associated target harvest and so our parameterization is deliberately 
skewed from this reality in order to give fishermen the strong incentives to avoid bycatch.  Figure 4 
shows the bycatch rates obtained at different harvest levels for the given values of quota allocations and 
technological parameters.  This parameterization is suggestive of a fairly “clean” technology and 
generous allocation of bycatch quota; only by harvesting at greater than 80% of one’s daily capacity can 
the bycatch rate exceed the ratio of bycatch to target quota.  Again, these parameterization decisions are 
motivated by a desire to test the common quota system under conditions which are most conducive to its 
success.   
  Despite the relatively high cost of discard, efficient technology and fairly generous specification of 
quota, we nevertheless discover that the bycatch quota binds rather quickly.  Indeed, a fishery of five 
participants is sufficient to cause bycatch to bind exclusively while twelve participants drive the harvest 
                                                 
10 A word of caution is warranted.  If the curvature of the daily profit function is such that  max max π h h =  then the 
right hand side of the participation condition in Table 1 goes to infinity showing that the QB interior solution has no 
upper bound.  Intuitively, given even an infinitesimal personal marginal cost of increased harvest (as is the case with 
large numbers of competitors), it always pays to stop short of maximizing daily profits.     15
rate to its upper bound.
11  When very small numbers of fishermen participate in the fishery, the 
equilibrium harvest rates correspond to those given by the quota-constrained social optimum and so they 
decrease with increased participation.  (This only happens for values of N less than 1.8 in this case, but 
there is no reason to believe that two or more fishermen may not harvest optimally under a different 
parameter specification.)  Very soon, however, the lack of full internalization of the marginal costs of 
harvest begins to manifest itself, leading to a phase in which QX binds in an interior fashion before 
entering a brief transitional plateau (between N = 3 and 4.5) in which both quotas bind and harvest rates 
are inelastic with respect to changes in fishery participation.   
  The effects of this lack of cost internalization are evident in the equilibrium season length and total 
variable rents.  As N increases, season durations fall very quickly below the optimal level, simultaneously 
opening a chasm between the rents obtainable if the social planner’s recommendations were implemented 
and the level achieved when fishermen act non-cooperatively.   
  The common allocation of quota creates an interesting variant of the “tragedy of the commons”.  The 
essence of this tragedy is not, as has been casually suggested, that bycatch quota binds well before all of 
the target quota can be fished.  At best, this is a symptom (albeit a strongly suggestive one) of the 
underlying disease, and, as shown in Figure 2, its absence does not indicate that all is well.  The essence 
of the tragedy lies in the mutually destructive incentives generated by the common quota structure that 
cause fishermen to increasingly ignore the effects of their behavior on the equilibrium season length.  The 
result leads inexorably (with the rare exception of extremely small fisheries) to wasted quota of either 
bycatch or target species and sub-optimal rents due to shortened seasons and excessive costs of sorting 
and discard.   
  The fact that target quotas are more often reached before bycatch quotas than vice versa may, as 
fishermen and biologists often claim, have something to do with the imperfect nature of their gear and the 
inadequate share of bycatch quota allowed by regulators.  However, the results of this analysis 
                                                 
11 In an effort to emphasize the transition between the different solution phases shown in Table 1, we represent N as 
a continuously varying quantity although Nash equilibrium solutions for non-integer values of N lack a clear 
interpretation in this model.    16
demonstrate that the perverse incentives generated by the regulatory system can easily overwhelm the 
advantages of clean fishing gears and liberal allocations of bycatch quota.  
4. MODEL SENSITIVITY AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
  To explore the implications of perturbations in the parameters of the model, we now utilize the initial 
values in Table 2 as our point of reference and conduct sensitivity analysis.
12  We consider the effects of 
changes in prices and bycatch disposal costs, quota allocations, and technological parameters.   
4.1 Changes in p 
  Figure 5 shows the equilibrium harvest rates for a spectrum of fishery sizes using the reference price 
level and values above and below it.  It is immediately obvious that increases in the price of the targeted 
species typically increase the harvest rate and thus the rate of bycatch; note the dramatic escalation of 
harvest to its maximum level at less than four vessels when p=0.6.  Recall from Theorem 1 that the social 
planner’s harvest rate exhibits no dependence on the level of economic parameters such as prices or 
discard costs – it only depends on technological and policy parameters.  In contrast, under a regulated 
equilibrium with common quotas, positive price shocks for the targeted species amplify the perverse 
incentives of fishermen and further widen the gap between optimal and Nash equilibrium rents.   
  When prices fall to a sufficiently low level (such as p=0.4 in Figure 4) an unusual phenomenon 
occurs.  The low price relative to the marginal costs of bycatch causes the peak of the daily profit function 
to occur within the feasible range for hX.  As a result, the equilibrium harvest rate approaches (but never 
exactly reaches)  max π h  as the size of the fishery grows.  This implies that even “large” fisheries may 
exhibit some behavioral response in harvest and bycatch rates as N varies when prices are sufficiently 
low. 
  What are the implications of these findings?  First, when fisheries are of small or moderate size we 
can expect that fluctuations in the price of targeted species have a marked effect upon harvest and bycatch 
behavior.  Secondly, when fisheries have a large number of participants and prices are relatively high 
                                                 
12 A MATLAB program that utilizes the analytical conditions in Table 2 to produce the graphical output in this 
paper is available upon request.    17
compared to discard costs, we can expect that significant increases or moderate decreases in prices will 
have little or no behavioral impact.  (This effect can be seen for N >12 when p fluctuates between 0.5 and 
0.6.)  However, negative price shocks that drive price below a critical threshold will always have a 
behavioral impact, regardless of the level of active capacity in the fishery.                        
4.2 Changes in technological parameters 
  A decrease in b reduces the bycatch rate experienced for any level of targeted harvest.  This 
parametric change seems to closely approximate the nature of many alterations to gears that are made to 
reduce bycatch.  For instance, the use of technologies that rely upon size or behavioral differences 
between species to reduce bycatch (e.g. Stone and Bublitz, 1995; Bublitz, 1995; Pikitch et al, 1995) 
typically result in the escapement of both targeted and bycatch species.  However, as long as the rate of 
escape for bycatch exceeds that of the target, without regard to how or where the gear is used, then a 
decrease in b captures this effect in a qualitative sense.  By controlling which gears are acceptable for use 
in the fishery, regulators may attempt to reduce equilibrium bycatch, lengthen fishing seasons and, 
hopefully, increase rents. 
  Figure 6 shows the results of various mandated technology changes that are depicted by shifts in b.  
Note that “cleaner” technologies actually induce higher harvest rates of the target species.  This occurs 
because a decrease in b lowers the effective marginal cost of a unit of harvest.  The increased incentive to 
harvest generally outweighs the increase in harvesting efficiency so that increases in the cleanness of 
technology typically lead to decreases in the equilibrium season length.  There are limitations on the 
range of circumstances over which this result occurs, however.  When the decrease in b is implemented 
from an already low level and b drops to a point where bycatch can no longer bind (as in the change from 
b=.45 to b=.35) then the resulting increase in harvest may be sufficiently small (due to the bound on the 
maximum harvest rates) to cause equilibrium seasons to increase versus the status quo for larger fishery 
sizes.  This can be seen in the fourth panel of Figure 7.  18
  The effect of increased selectivity on rents is similarly mixed.  Consider when N>5 in Figure 7.  If b 
is sufficiently large to cause  max max π h h = then marginal improvements in harvesting efficiency (as when b 
falls from .65 to .55) yield no improvement in rents – the increased harvest and lowered costs of discard 
are exactly offset by the reduction in season length.  However, if the improvement in bycatch efficiency is 
large enough to drive the equilibrium harvest rate to its maximum level for a particular N, then average 
rents may increase.   
  The implications for fishery management may be summarized as follows.  First, when starting with 
very “dirty” technology, mandating a small improvement in efficiency/selectivity will, at best, yield a 
modest increase in average rents and result in a shorter season.  Second, moderate improvements from a 
low level of efficiency may yield some increase in average rents but usually only for fisheries with a 
reasonably large number of participants.  Third, the larger the proposed increase in efficiency, the greater 
the range of fishery sizes that will exhibit an increase in rents.  Finally, these increases in rents are 
somewhat artificial because they are due to the constraining effects of the physical limits on harvest that 
prevent agents from fully equalizing marginal benefits and costs and thus fully dissipating the potential 
gains from the new harvesting technology.  If the marginal benefits substantially outweighed marginal 
costs in equilibrium, then we might expect increased investment in harvesting capacity in the future in an 
attempt to capture these potential rents.    
  This discussion of rents also ignores the additional costs of purchasing and operating the new 
technology which may overwhelm any increase in variable rents.  Ward (1994) utilized a dynamic, multi-
fleet model to show that decreases in bycatch species catchability are likely to exhibit few long-run 
benefits due to the compensating effects of increased effort in the targeted fishery for the bycatch species.  
Our results complement this conclusion by suggesting that technological improvements may be of limited 
utility even when considered from a short-run perspective and where no targeted fishery for the bycatch 
species exists.  Furthermore, the ultimate lack of any improvement in rents from widespread adoption of 
more efficient gears suggests that there may be limited incentive for rational, forward-looking fishermen   19
to invest in or assist in the development of such technologies.    
  The results for perturbations of α, as shown in Figure 7, are similar in many respects to those for b.  
This similarity is driven by the fact that both b and α have a positive effect on the marginal cost of 
harvest.  As a result, increases in α (at least for moderate to large fisheries) result in decreases in daily 
harvests and thus longer seasons.  A notable difference, however, between this case and that for b is that 
rents actually increase rather than decrease in α.  
  What is the real-world analog to changing α?  On first glance it seems difficult to imagine a 
modification of fishing gears that does not confound a change in α with what is more adequately and 
intuitively captured by a simple change in b.  In real-world situations, however, the quantity and 
composition of catch are a result of interaction between the production possibilities of the gear and the 
“raw materials” supplied to this production process by the ecological system the gear is utilized within.  
Perhaps then, b and α may be roughly decomposed along these same lines with b representing the 
intrinsic efficiency of a particular fishing gear and α capturing the effect of intrinsic characteristics of the 
physical/biological system – particularly those aspects associated with the spatial cross-correlation of 
species densities.   
  Consider Figure 8.  Note how when α is large that high daily harvests of the target are associated with 
very large bycatch rates whereas bycatch rates at low harvest levels are actually quite low.  If a fisherman 
can be expected to fish in a single locality for any given day then the bycatch rate and harvest recorded 
for that day are indicative of the relative biomass of the species at that point.  It therefore follows that 
large values of α coincide with high degrees of spatial cross-correlation in bycatch and target densities; on 
average unusually large bycatch densities are associated with especially dense concentrations of target 
species and vice versa.   
  Surprisingly, this spatial autocorrelation in bycatch and targeted species turns out to be a positive 
characteristic that leads to more conservative harvest behavior and increased rents.  The pursuit of 
attractive “clusters” of target in a high-α situation carries with it the strong possibility that the harvest of 
those clusters will result in significant costs to oneself.  Low-α fisheries, those with less clustering  20
together of bycatch and target species assemblages, weaken this behavioral nexus since, on average, the 
penalty for exploiting high-density areas is lower.    
4.3 Changes in quota allocations 
  Given the short-run nature of this model, the technological parameters (b, α andh ) are intrinsically 
dependent upon the quantity and distribution of biomass for bycatch and targeted species.  In most (but 
not all) modern industrialized fisheries the total allowable catch (TAC) is predetermined based on 
biological criteria and competing fleets expend substantial time and resources lobbying regulators over 
how to divide this fixed pie (or, rather, a series of such pies).  It is of some value then to ask what would 
happen if a fleet obtained more or less quota apart from any underlying changes in the biomass that would 
justify such an alteration.   
  Since bycatch is the limiting factor for even comparatively generous allocations of QX and “clean” 
fishing technologies, we limit our discussion to the impact of changes in QB.  Figure 9 shows the results 
of three different quota allocations, one more liberal than in our base specification and another less so.  It 
should be noted that the highest allocation of QB is so large that it is no longer technologically feasible for 
the bycatch quota to bind at any level of harvest.   
  The result of increasing the quantity of bycatch quota is to (weakly) increase the harvest rate for any 
fishery size – this despite the fact that for all but the smallest N the optimal harvest rate should be 
invariant with respect to QB (see Theorem 1).  Note, however, that moderate increases in quota (those that 
preserve the possibility of bycatch binding) lead to no differences in harvest behavior for fisheries of 
sufficient size.  If QB is raised to the point where it can no longer bind, then target quota binds for all 
fishery sizes and fishermen are driven to exert even larger amounts of effort than they would have 
otherwise.   
  The impacts on equilibrium rents and season lengths are ambiguous for a limited range of fishery 
sizes; an increase in quota could lead to an equilibrium with lower rents and a shorter season than the 
status quo!  Nevertheless, as the size of a fishery grows, a clear pattern of increased rents with increases 
in bycatch quota emerges; otherwise, we would be hard-pressed to explain the pervasive desire of  21
fishermen to expand their bycatch quota.  This loosening of the constraints on fishermen does narrow the 
gap between optimal and non-cooperative rents, but the potential for improvement is limited.  Once 
bycatch quota is sufficiently plentiful that it can no longer bind, increased allocations yield no behavioral 
effect and the noncooperative outcome remains suboptimal for virtually all fishery sizes.   
4.4 The optimal penalty for bycatch 
  A cursory examination of the necessary conditions in Table 1 suggests that the effects of an increase 
in c and a decrease in p are qualitatively the same.  This is indeed the case, and so we do not consider the 
effects of fluctuations in this parameter.  Rather, we examine how c might be exploited as a policy 
instrument.   
 We  have  motivated  c as the internal “production” cost of bycatch due to sorting and discards, but any 
cost of bycatch that is born on a per-unit basis will exert an equivalent effect.  Consider then an “effluent 
penalty” τ on bycatch so that the full personal cost of bycatch is c + τ .  At what level must this penalty 
be set to cause the Nash equilibrium to mimic the social planner’s solution?  How do changes in 
economic, technical and regulatory parameters alter the penalty?    
  For the sake of brevity, we consider only the case where the fishery is large enough such that QX  
binds for the social planner.
13  The task then is to adjust the penalty so that the conditions for the 
equilibrium described in the second row of Table 1 are always satisfied.  The minimum penalty required 
to accomplish this feat is, not surprisingly, the Pigouvian tax where the marginal benefits of increased 
harvest just equal the personal marginal costs (penalty included) at the optimum season length of T (i.e. 
at the transition between the first two equilibria in Table 1).  Setting  T T = ˆ and solving for τ yields: 






















τ .                                           (6)       
                                                 
13 Little is lost by this simplification; the case for QB binding is quite similar.  Moreover, in practice QX typically 
begins to bind for very small values of N at a variety of reasonable parameter values (for N >1.19 for the parameter 
values in Table 2).   22
This penalty is increasing in the price of the targeted species and decreasing to the extent that high costs 
of sorting and discard already supply some disincentive to high bycatch rates.  Relatively inefficient gears 
(those characterized by high values of b) actually necessitate lower unit penalties since the disincentive 
toward more rapid harvest is magnified via b in the marginal cost function.  An increase in the allocation 
of target quota will also lead to a decrease in the optimal τ  for a given fishery size.  Not surprisingly, the 
optimal bycatch penalty is increasing in the number of fishery participants; the decreased 
“internalization” of the season-length externality with increased N ensures this result.   
  In this discussion we have acted as if there is a single optimal penalty for a particular situation, and 
yet this is not the case.  There are actually a range of penalties in excess of (6) that would work equally 
well in inducing optimal behavior, although (6) does so at least cost to the fishermen.  The indeterminate 
nature of the optimal penalty occurs because all that is needed is a sufficiently large penalty to cause the 
season length constraint to have a non-negative shadow value at the optimal harvest rate (in other words, 
to cause the marginal costs of additional harvest to exceed the marginal benefits).  One offshoot of this 
result is that penalties that are set a bit high for the current situation are then robust (in the sense of 
maintaining optimal behavior) for slightly larger or smaller fisheries or for local variations in 
parameters.
14 
  Throughout this discussion we have utilized the term “penalty” instead of “tax”.  This is intended to 
highlight the fact that although this penalty clearly resembles the classic Pigouvian tax, we need not limit 
ourselves to it exclusively.  Indeed, given the assumptions of the model, the bycatch penalty could be 
assessed via other mechanisms and that yield the same result.  For instance, fishermen could be compelled 
to purchase quota for every unit of bycatch they expend and τ would represent the appropriate quota 
price.  Alternatively, τ could represent the monetary equivalent of the mutual “social pressure” that must 
be brought to bear by their peers on individual vessels for each excess unit of bycatch in order to induce 
optimal harvest and bycatch behavior (where fishermen perfectly observe each other’s catch and can be 
                                                 
14 There is a limit to this robustness.  If a penalty is set too high then the argmax of the daily profit function may fall 
below the minimum level needed to exhaust QX in T .  This would result in leaving behind un-fished quota at the 
end of the year which is clearly suboptimal.    23
relied upon to administer the proper punishment).  Finally, a cooperative could be formed where equal 
allocations of target and bycatch quota are distributed among members according to their harvest of each 
species in the optimal solution.  It can be shown that atomistic behavior on the part of fishermen will then 
lead to the optimal outcome.
15  Figure 10 shows the harvest rate, optimal penalty and total rents for the 
Nash equilibrium solution when the optimal penalty is applied and the revenues collected from the 
penalty are re-distributed in an incentive compatible fashion to fishermen.  Note the now perfect 
correspondence between the optimal and Nash equilibrium solutions.                         
 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
  The structure of our simplified model matches conditions encountered in many real-world fisheries in 
which a common-quota form of management has been implemented.  A good example is the case of the 
yellowfin sole trawl fishery in the Eastern Bering Sea.  This fishery, the largest flatfish fishery in the U.S. 
in terms of catch, has regularly fallen well short of its biologically determined sustainable allocation of 
yellowfin sole (see Figure 11).  An examination of the yellowfin sole fishery’s bycatch of Pacific halibut 
over the same time period (Figure 12) suggests why, namely that the bycatch allocation of halibut has 
been fully exhausted in nine of the last twelve years.  In this fishery, meeting the halibut bycatch quota 
triggers severe restrictions on the retention of yellowfin sole that effectively close the fishery.
16  Indeed, 
fishermen in the yellowfin fishery have had their target fishery closed for a month or two every year due 
to halibut bycatch, despite efforts on the part of regulators to lengthen the season by subdividing quota on 
an intra-seasonal basis.  In many years the quotas of halibut bycatch were exceeded by significant 
amounts before the fishery could be closed as the rapid pace of fishing and the associated high bycatch 
rates frequently overwhelmed the information processing capabilities of regulators.   
                                                 
15 All of these instruments have focused on penalizing bycatch and have ignored the fact any penalty instrument on 
bycatch has an equivalent instrument for the targeted species due to the precise nature of their complementarity in 
this model.  We have chosen to ignore this since such a relationship would cease to exist in many real-world 
situations where multiple bycatch species are associated with a single target.  In these cases, a single instrument on 
the target would be inadequate to induce efficiency unless the bycatch species were all perfectly complementary 
with one another.    
16 The three years in which the halibut quota did not bind saw spatial closures due to Tanner and red king crab 
bycatch that also severely limited the fishery.   
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  In the public discussions over bycatch in the yellowfin sole fishery, a variety of factors have been 
used to explain the consistent underfishing of yellowfin sole and overfishing of halibut relative to their 
quotas.  Some observers point to trends of larger recruitment to the halibut biomass that have not been 
matched with corresponding increases in allocation of halibut bycatch quota and/or relatively low prices 
for yellowfin sole as possible explanations (Holland and Ginter, 2004).  However, others are coming to 
believe that these causes are minor compared to those inherent to the common property quota system 
(Gauvin, Haflinger and Nerini, 1995).  Fishermen have begun to voluntarily experiment with a range of 
policies that alter economic incentives to “fish dirty” including providing information about high bycatch 
areas, identifying high bycatch vessels and shaming them by publicizing information, and joining 
“penalty box” programs that force high bycatch fishermen to sit out ongoing fisheries.  In fact, the current 
campaign by Alaskan flatfish fishermen to form a harvesters’ cooperative similar to that established under 
the American Fisheries Act for the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands pollock fishery is motivated in large part 
by the desire of fishermen to implement their own individual incentive based system of bycatch 
accountability.   
  The yellowfin sole fishery in the Bering Sea is but one example of many multispecies fisheries in the 
world currently governed under the common quota system for both target and bycatch species.  Many 
fisheries for cod, rock sole, various flatfish species and rockfish in both Alaska and elsewhere are 
governed by similar regulatory systems and have been plagued by many of the same problems.  These 
fisheries are mostly license-limited, with species and gear “endorsements” that permit vessels to pursue 
various target/bycatch combinations in specific areas and at specific times with specified gear.  Such 
fisheries range in size from small (eg. wreckfish fishery with 4 vessels, atka mackerel with 6 vessels, the 
pre-coop pacific whiting fisheries with 4 companies) to medium (pre-coop Bering Sea pollock fishery 
with 8 companies, the pacific cod hook/line catcher vessel fishery with 5-15 vessels), to larger (pacific 
cod catcher/processer with 40).   With numbers of participants in these size ranges, it is clearly plausible 
to conjecture that decision making is strategic rather than atomistic.    25
  We have developed a model that explains characteristics of these and other similar fisheries governed 
by multiple common pool quotas.  The model shows how changes in key parameters can change the 
nature of Nash equilibrium harvest, season length and rents – generating predictions that point the way to 
testable empirical hypotheses and providing further insights into the linkages between behavior, 
technology, regulations, and fishery performance.  An important insight from this exercise is the 
identification of yet another form of rent dissipation associated with insecure harvest privileges.  In this 
case, there is a “race for fish” in a joint production setting that triggers common pool regulation reactions 
by regulators.  These regulations are well intentioned in the sense that they are designed to prevent 
biological overharvesting of both the target and bycatch species, and in fact, common pool quotas and 
season closure instruments are generally successful in this regard when properly monitored with timely 
information dissemination.
17  However, while common pool quotas may be effective instruments to 
address biological objectives, they exacerbate rather than solve the fundamental economic problem, 
which is insecure harvesting privileges.  The fruit of this system is rent dissipation on a number of fronts, 
from wasted target quota, high discard costs, and shortened seasons which can increase costs and lead to 
losses in the product market from reduced product quality and skewed product mixes.     
  Our paper ultimately raises the question of how to best regulate bycatch in complex multispecies 
fisheries.  A look through most of the fisheries science and management literature would persuade the 
reader that the problem is really a technical problem, solvable mainly by the development of alternative 
gear.  But our paper suggests that observed bycatch is actually a much more complicated outcome of gear 
design, spatial ecology, regulations, and ultimately, of human strategic behavior.  This suggests that the 
range of policy options is certainly broader than simply technological options and that further analytical 
and empirical work is needed to assess the merits and drawbacks of incentive-based approaches including 
individual bycatch quotas, fishing cooperatives, and voluntary group sanctions.  In the final analysis, the 
bycatch policy problem poses an important fundamental question, namely, how much of the problem is 
                                                 
17 Of course, this success is only valid when viewed from a single-species paradigm of management.  If quotas are 
obtained with the goal of managing assemblages of species, then harm may arise on an ecosystem scale from 
substantial underfishing of some quotas relative to others.    26
inherently technological and how much of it is behavioral or institutional.  This is an issue that has not 
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Table 1: Equilibrium Conditions for Game when Either Quota is Capable of Binding
18  
















































































































QX   T  









































































































































































































































































  or 
) , , , , , (
1
1

































































Table 2: Base Parameter Values for Policy Simulations 
 
B  0.45   α 1.5 
QX  700  Q B  400 
P  0.5  c  0.5 
T   365   h  2.0 
 
                                                 
18The implicit functions ) (⋅ f and ) (⋅ g are defined, respectively, as the values of N such that the interior equilibrium 
season lengths evaluated at the internal solution values of  X h ˆ for QX and QB  (as found on the 1
st and 4
th rows of 








Figure 1: Graphs of Own Profit
Function, Profit Contours (with
Reaction Function), and Binding
Quota Contours (light gray = Tbar
binds, medium gray = QX binds,
dark gray =  QB binds) for N=2. 
 
Figure 2: Graphs of Own Profit
Function, Profit Contours (with
Reaction Function), and Binding
Quota Contours (light gray = Tbar
binds, medium gray = QX binds,
dark gray =  QB binds) for N=12.  31

































































































Figure 3: Nash Equilibrium and Optimal Harvest, Season Length, and Rents and Percentage of 
Quotas Fished Under the Nash Equilibrium Solution for Various Fishery Sizes. 
 




























Figure 4: Bycatch Rate for Various Harvest Rates at Base Parameter Values  32































Figure 5: Nash Equilibrium Harvest Rates for Various Target Species Prices 
 


























































































Figure 6: Nash Equilibrium Harvest, Season Length, Rents, and Season Length (detail) for Differing Values 
of b  33










































































































Figure 7: Nash Equilibrium 
Harvest Rate, Season Length 
and Rents for Different Values 
of α  34
 











































































Figure 9: Nash Equilibrium 
Harvest, Season Length and 
Rents for Various Allocations 
of Bycatch Quota 
  35











































































































Figure 10: Nash Equilibrium Harvest, Rents and Quota Utilization Compared Against Social Planner Levels 






























































Quota Catch Quota Utilization
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Figure 12: Catch, Quota and Percentage Quota Utilization of Halibut Bycatch Quota in the Eastern Bering 





























APPENDIX: DERIVATION OF CONDITIONS FOR NASH EQUILIBRIA 
  To establish the necessity of the conditions for Nash equilibria, we posit particular solutions and then 
develop conditions under which 1) the beliefs (about the identity of the binding quota) are consistent with 
those obtained under the solution, 2) where the implied harvest rate and season length honor the 
constraints of the model, and 3) where there is no incentive to marginally deviate from the solution.  In 
order to establish sufficiency of these conditions, we provide arguments that show that the necessary 
conditions not only protect against marginal (quota preserving) individual deviations but also prevent 
non-marginal (non quota preserving) deviations as well.  We rely on intuitive arguments rather than 
algebraic proofs where possible since the mathematics is generally more tedious than instructive.  
Solutions from these analytical conditions were numerically tested over numerous parameterizations 
using a program written in MATLAB such that we are confident of their correctness.
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(N2)  ) , , , , , ( ˆ T Q b c p f N T T X α ≥ ⎯→ ⎯ ≥    
The equilibrium harvest rate is easily obtained via equation (5).  Condition (N1) ensures that the 
equilibrium harvest rate falls below the threshold level at which the bycatch quota begins to bind.  (N2) 
keeps the harvest rate from dropping to a point where the season length constraint is no longer honored.  
No condition is needed to ensure that  max ˆ h hX ≤  given (N1) and the assumptions underlying Case 1.   
                                                 
19 All MATLAB code is available upon request from the authors.    38
Given the interiority of this solution there is obviously no marginal incentive to deviate.   
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N   
Condition (N1) is the same as in the previous equilibrium; an internal QX equilibrium is supported under 
this criteria.  However, unlike before, this harvest rate leads to an equilibrium season length that exceeds 
the season limit (N2).  In order to avoid leaving excess target species at the end of the season, every 
fisherman has an incentive to increase his harvest rate until QX binds atT .  (N3) ensures that the resulting 
season length still falls below the upper threshold for QX to bind.   
  There is no marginal pressure to deviate upward from this solution, since doing so would only drive 
the agent further from the internal “peak” they would prefer to achieve given a longer season.  Downward 
deviations in the harvest rate are trivially eliminated.             

















































































N   
The solution in this case is analogous to the interior equilibrium for QX and (N1) and (N2) have very 
similar interpretations.  Condition (N3) is needed to bound the equilibrium harvest rate below hmax.  This 
condition is only needed when  max π h h ≤ ; otherwise, the right hand side of this inequality goes to infinity 
and the condition becomes redundant.  Given the interiority of this equilibrium, there are clearly no 
reasons for any participant to marginally deviate from this solution.   

































































































(N2b)  ) , , , , , ( ˆ
int T Q b c p g N T T B α ≤ ⎯→ ⎯ ≤   
(N1a) is the converse of (N1) in the interior case, indicating a situation in which the interior equilibrium 
harvest rate would fall below the value for which it is technologically possible for QB to bind.  
Fishermen’s beliefs fail to be self-consistent and they have left both bycatch and target species behind.  
An agent’s profits can be improved by fishing a bit less efficiently up until the point where the season 
limit engages just as the bycatch quota binds.  At this point there is no marginal incentive to decrease 
one’s harvest rate since doing so would merely lower daily profits with no gain in season length.  It is also  40
possible to prove via a trivial albeit tedious bit of algebra that there is no incentive to marginally increase 
one’s harvest.  (N2a) ensures that N is sufficiently small to draw a harvest level over the threshold such 
that QB can bind.   
  (N1b) is the same as (N1) representing a case in which the interior solution does fall above the 
threshold for which bycatch can bind.  However, (N2b) shows that this rate of harvest is too small to 
exhaust the quota by season’s end.  The incentive then is to incrementally raise one’s effort until all 
available bycatch is exhausted just as T is reached.  There is obviously no incentive to fish “cleaner” at 
this point since the season can be no longer.  It is also trivial to show that there is no marginal incentive to 
further increase one’s effort – the increases in daily profits are outweighed by the associated losses from a 
shorter season.   




































































































Condition (N1) has the same basis as (N1a) of the previous case – fishermen individually face incentives 
to employ as low a harvest rate as is consistent with their belief that QB binds.  (N2) is the converse of 
(N2a) indicating a situation in which N is too large to support the previous corner solution since the 
associated harvest level will cause the target species to bind at T rather than the bycatch species.  As a 
result, ever fisherman employs the minimal amount of effort consistent with their belief that bycatch  41
binds, causing the season length to decline below it maximum level.  It is a trivial exercise in algebra to 
rule out upward deviations in the harvest rate.  Downward movements are problematic, however, since 
even the slightest deviation changes the binding quota to QX. To rule out profitable downward deviations 
we require that the derivative of the objective function (4) with respect to one’s harvest rate evaluated at 
htrans (where QX binds) be positive.  (N3) is the condition that results.  Note that this condition is the 
converse of (N1) for both cases in which QX binds; it is necessary that no “target” equilibria be possible 
for this equilibrium to hold.   
F. QB Binding – Corner Solution (hmax binding) 























Note that (N1) is the converse of (N3) in the interior equilibrium case.  In this case N is simply too large 
for an interior equilibrium to be possible.  As a result, agents simply harvest as quickly as possible.  
Assumption 2 ensures that QB binds, so no further conditions are needed.  There is no marginal incentive 
to deviate since (N1) rules out the profitability of downward deviations in harvest and there is no capacity 
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If hmax = max π h,  
(N1b)  ) , , , , , ( ˆ T Q b c p f N T T X α ≥ ⎯→ ⎯ ≥    
Since QB can no longer bind, there is no longer any need for a condition analogous to (N1) from the 
interior “QX binding” case.  However, (N2a) is needed here to ensure that the harvest rate falls below the 
maximum allowable level.  This condition is not needed when the argmax of the daily profit function falls 
belowh .  In this case it is never individually optimal to operate at the peak of the daily profit function 
and so the right hand side of (N2a) grows infinitely large.  (N1a) and (N1b) are needed in either case to 
ensure that the season length constraint is honored.  Parallel arguments to this same equilibrium type for 
Case 1 establish that there is no incentive for deviation from this solution. 
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(N1)  ) , , , , , ( ˆ
int T Q b c p f N T T X α < ⎯→ ⎯ <  
This solution is analogous to its namesake for Case 1.  However, (N1) in that case is no longer necessary 
since Case 2 precludes QB ever binding.  (N3) is now guaranteed by the combination of the mathematical 
condition for Case 2 and Assumption 2.  The same logic employed for Case 1 rules out the possibility of 
profitable marginal deviations in this case.   
I. QX Binding – Corner Solution (hmax binding)    
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This solution is the counterpart to the first part of the interior solution for this case and is similar in spirit 
to the “QB Binding – Corner Solution (hmax binding)” solution for Case 1.  (N1) and (N2) show that one 
would like to reach an interior solution but this solution lies beyond the maximum harvest rate that is 
technologically possible.  As a result, agents harvest at this maximum level.  Notice that hits solution 
never holds when hmax = max π h .  Parallel arguments to those used for the “QB Binding – Corner Solution 
(hmax binding)” solution establish that there are no profitable marginal deviations from this solution.   
Sufficiency Arguments 
  We now need to establish conditions under which the equilibria described above are not only 
impervious to marginal deviations in harvest but are also devious to individual deviations in the harvest 
rate that could lead to a change in the binding quota.  The following Lemma is helpful in this regard: 
  Lemma 1: No rational, noncooperative agent will prefer to deviate from one of the candidate 
equilibria described above to cause a situation in which T binds alone.   
The proof of this fact is simple and easily expressed in words.  By deviating, individuals place themselves 
in a situation where the marginal profitability of an extra unit of harvest  ) ( X h Tπ′  is always positive.  As a 
result, an agent will desire to increase their harvest until one of the quotas “bites”.  With this fact in hand, 
we only need to consider those deviations that involve switching from one binding quota to another.   
  Equilibrium D is certainly robust to any downward deviations in harvest, since the season length is 
already maximized.  It is also the case that there are no profitable increases in harvest since such increases 
would result in a situation in which bycatch quota still binds and it has already been shown that quota-
preserving deviations do not pay off.  Therefore, the necessary conditions for D are also sufficient to 
establish it as a symmetric, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.    Upward deviations in harvest for 
candidate equilibria C, E, and F are likewise eliminated due to the fact that they are all quota-preserving 
and thus subject to the same reasoning employed for D.  Downward deviations in harvest are more 
difficult to eliminate, but the following lemma proves very helpful:  44























, there is no incentive to deviate from any candidate solution in 
which QB binds.            
It is intuitive although tedious to prove that an individual’s objective function (4) evaluated at a particular 
binding quota cannot possess an interior minimum.  Therefore, if the first derivative of the profit function 
with QX binding is positive at the threshold harvest rate between the two quotas (htrans) then we can rest 
assured it is positive at all lower values as well and so Lemma 2 provides a strong condition under which 
it never pays to deviate in a downward direction from a “bycatch binding equilibrium”.  It is clear upon 
immediate inspection, however, that the necessary conditions already assure that this condition holds for 
all QB equilibria.  We can now state with confidence that the necessary conditions for C, D, E, and F are 
also sufficient to guarantee their status as Nash equilibria.   
  The reasoning to establish the sufficiency of the necessary conditions for the Case 1 QX equilibria is 
analogous.  One way to eliminate a profitable upward deviation in this case is to find under what 
conditions the first derivative of the objective function (4) with QB binding is negative at htrans.  In this 
case, the marginal returns to increased harvest must be negative for all larger values of daily harvest as 
well.   A condition that ensures this is given by the following lemma: 































, there is no incentive to deviate from any candidate solution in 
which QX binds. 
Again, this inequality is assured by the necessary conditions for both A and B.  We can now say that the 
necessary conditions for A and B are also sufficient to characterize them as Nash equilibria.   
  The necessary conditions for candidate equilibria in Case 2 are sufficient by definition since agents 
are not able in this case to cause QB to bind.              45
  A careful look at the full set of necessary and sufficient conditions reveals that they embrace all 
positive values of N and none of the equilibria are found to overlap with one another in N-space.  We 
have therefore succeeded in finding a symmetric, pure strategy Nash equilibrium for any combination of 
parameter values or number of participants.
20 
   
 








                                                 
20 We do not argue for the uniqueness of these solutions in the class of pure strategy, symmetric equilibria although 
this seems likely.   